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Abstract—With the popularity of intelligent mobile devices,
enormous urban information has been generated and required
by the public. In response, ShanghaiGrid (SG) aims to providing
abundant information services to the public. With fixed schedule
and urban-wide coverage, an appealing service in SG is to provide
free message delivery service to the public using buses, which
allows mobile device users to send messages to locations of
interest via buses. The main challenge in realizing this service
is to provide efficient routing scheme with privacy preservation
under highly dynamic urban traffic condition. In this paper, we
present an innovative scheme BusCast to tackle this problem.
In BusCast, buses can pick up and forward personal messages
to their destination locations in a store-carry-forward fashion.
For each message, BusCast conservatively associates a routing
graph rather than a fixed routing path with the message in
order to adapt the dynamic of urban traffic. Meanwhile, the
privacy information about the user and the message destination
is concealed from both intermediate relay buses and outside
adversaries. Both rigorous privacy analysis and extensive trace-
driven simulations demonstrate the efficacy of BusCast scheme.
Index Terms—Anonymous communication, backward unlink-
ability, message delivery, traffic analysis attacks, and vehicular
networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the prosperity of powerful intelligent mobile de-vices, e.g., tablets and smart phones, urban sensing
information, such as photos of events, audio and video records,
has been largely enriched. The ever-increasing demands for
sharing such information posed from the public have become
a serious challenge. In response to the challenge, the Shanghai
government has established the ShanghaiGrid (SG) project
since 2005, with the ambitious goal of building a metropolitan-
scale information service system. Among others, one promis-
ing application in SG is to provide message delivery service
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in which mobile users can send messages to some locations
of interest, such as homes, workplaces and public agents. The
goal of the application is three-fold. First, it should guarantee
anonymous data communication for users, which hides the
privacy information stating who is communicating with whom
and for what purpose from others. For example, Alice may
take a picture of an event and would like to send it to the
police station as evidence. Certainly, she will not send her ID
information with the picture or want her identity information
being exposed by any means. Second, the end-to-end delivery
may not have to be real-time but should be short. Last, the
system should provide large service coverage to the public in
terms of both geographical and temporal distributions.
To achieve the message delivery service, one possible so-
lution is to use conventional cellular networks (e.g., GPRS
and 3G) or satellite techniques, which can provide very short
delivery delay. However, the privacy of mobile users in terms
of identities and their interested location information is not
well protected from the network operators. In addition, it also
causes tremendous communication cost for data transmission.
Recently, vehicular networks [1], [2], [3] have emerged as
the new landscape of mobile ad hoc network, in which data
communication is carried out in a store-carry-and-forward
fashion. In SG, we consider to use buses (forming a bus
network) for message delivery because of three major reasons.
First, in urban settings, with the dense and wide distribution,
commuting buses can reach a very high coverage. For example
in Shanghai, with a communication range of 600 meters, the
area covered by buses can be reached up to 90% of the
downtown area. Second, the achievable end-to-end delay is
convincing for most delay tolerant applications with fixed bus
routes and schedules. Last, as buses are public vehicles, it is
practical to provide such a service to the public without the
concern of failures caused by selfish behavior.
To achieve efficient and anonymous message delivery with
buses, however, is very challenging for three reasons. First,
due to the dynamic surface traffic, buses may experience un-
expected delays, which means the contacts between a pair of
buses cannot be accurately predicted even with the fixed bus
schedules. In this case, simply using a pre-determined shortest
routing path calculated based on the static bus schedules is
not feasible. Another naive solution can flood a message over
the network, which can achieve shortest delivery delay but
arouse prohibitive network traffic. Second, because of the
requirement of anonymous communication, all identification
information such as identities, locations, and routing paths
must be removed from messages before being sent over open
channels. Without the knowledge about the receiver, it is
hard for an intermediate node to make an efficient routing
decision. Last, even though identifying information can be well
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protected, it is much harder to defend against traffic analysis 
attacks, where adversaries observe the encrypted traffic flow 
to infer the relationship between messages. In consequence, 
messages can be traced forward to the destinations or back-
ward to the sources [5]. One possible solution is to use Onion 
routing [6], in which a message encrypted by the sender can 
be stripped off layer by layer by intermediate relay buses. 
Each relay bus can only get the information of its next-hop 
and forward the message accordingly. This method needs the 
sender to determine the chain of all relay buses in advance. 
In the dynamic scenario of bus network, however, it is hard 
to accurately pre-determine an optimal routing path in terms 
of minimizing the delivery delay. Another alternative solution 
is to use universal re-encryption [7], [8] in which each relay 
bus re-encrypts a message without knowing the identity of the 
receiver. The solution needs to explicitly provide the identity 
of the receiver to relay buses, which would disclose the privacy 
of the receiver. As a result, there is no successful solution, to 
the best of our knowledge, to provisioning efficient private 
message delivery in bus networks.
In this paper, we propose an innovative message delivery 
scheme in bus networks, called BusCast, which provides a 
set of routing mechanisms flexible t o t he u ncertainty o f bus 
contacts caused by dynamic surface traffic while provisioning 
anonymous communication for users. BusCast elegantly in-
tegrates three key techniques. First, BusCast users can plan a 
routing graph for a message, which is made up of a set of relay 
rules indicating how the packet would transfer between bus 
routes. Second, we design an Anonymous Routing Structure 
(ARS) to indicate routing information for intermediate relay 
buses by embedding the routing graph in the message. With 
the ARS, relay buses can only recover their own routing 
instructions about which bus routes are the next hop presented 
in the routing paths. Last, each relay bus re-generates the 
ARS, and the confidential m essages o f u sers a re a lso re-
encrypted on each relay bus using a universal re-encryption 
scheme, which requires no public key of message receivers. 
Combining the two together eliminates the linkability between 
incoming and outgoing packets, which can defend against 
traffic analysis a ttacks. The s trong point of BusCast design is 
that even if the secrets of one or more bus routes are exposed, 
anonymous communication can still be achieved. Thorough 
privacy analysis shows that the BusCast design can protect 
user privacy well. We also verify the routing performance of 
BusCast though extensive trace-driven simulations that involve 
199 bus routes in Shanghai city.
We highlight our main contributions in this paper as follows:
• We have considered the dynamic of suffice traffic in real-
izing message delivery service and design an ARS, which
conceals identification information from other buses and
outside adversaries and provides plenty of flexibility in
making routing decision.
• We allow intermediate buses embedded in an ARS to re-
generate the ARS without the need to know the routing
graph, which makes buses act as both message routers
and mix proxies of a mix net [4] and therefore can defend
against traffic analysis attacks and guarantee anonymous
communications.
• We have conducted both privacy, performance analysis
and extensive trace-driven simulations to demonstrate the
efficacy of BusCast design.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces related work. In Section III, we characterize the
unique features of bus networks. Section IV describes the
system and attack models in bus networks and presents the
design goals. Section V present the overview of BusCast. We
elaborate the technique of flexible routing with routing graph
in Section VI. In Section VII, the details of privacy preserving
packet forwarding using Anonymous Routing Structure are
described. Section VIII presents the privacy and performance
analysis of BusCast. Several design issues that may be encoun-
tered in practice are discussed in Section IX. In Section X, we
conduct trace-driven simulations to evaluate the performance
of BusCast and present the results. Finally, we conclude and
outline the directions for future work in Section XI.
II. RELATED WORK
Since the concept of mix net was first introduced by Chaum
for anonymous communications in Internet [4], many studies
have followed Chaum’s approach such as Web-MIXes [9],
Tarzan [10], Mixminion [11], AOS [12]. A mix node is a
proxy batched modifies input messages and outputs them in
a random order, called mixing. In this way, it is hardly to
correlate a comes in message with a goes out message, which
can be leveraged to defend against the traffic analysis attacks.
Several mixing schemes are designed for providing anony-
mous routing in mobile networks, such as ANODR [13],
SDAR [14], AnonDSR [15]. These schemes share two com-
mon features. First, all these schemes demand a route discov-
ery phase before forwarding a packet, which enables the sender
to discover and establishes a secure routing path via a number
of intermediate wireless nodes to the receiver. Second, all these
schemes use the layer-by-layer en/decryptions. The significant
feature of these schemes is that the layers should be peeled
in sequence, and each time can only be peeled one layer.
However, the strictly defined routing path lack of flexibility
to adapt rapid changes of mobility of vehicular networks. Y.
Fan et al. [16] proposed a network coding scheme combining
with homomorphic encryption functions to protect the source
anonymity from traffic analysis and flow tracing attacks in
multi-hop wireless networks. They considered a multicast
network. Intermediate nodes buffer the received packets until
all the packets belonging to same session are available and
perform random linear coding on these packets. However,
the scheme cannot work well in vehicular networks, since
the opportunistic routing makes it hard to collect all packets
belonging to the same session at the same intermediate.
There are two works closely related to this paper, R. Jansen
et al. introduced a TPS scheme [17] to address the anonymity
issues in DTN. In the scheme, nodes are divided into several
groups. Senders generate a one-time secret key to encrypt each
message and the identities of receivers. Senders use secret
sharing scheme to divide the secret into pieces, and each piece
is encrypted using a group key. Each relay node decrypts a
piece of secret using the group key it holds. Node decrypting
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 11, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2012 3
Fig. 1: The distribution of bus lines within the
downtown area of Shanghai city, with 199 bus
lines involved.
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Fig. 2: Bus network coverage under different
communication ranges.
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Fig. 3: Comparison of one-way traverse time of
buses between off-peak and peak hours.
the last piece of secret can recover the original secret key.
Then the message and identity of receiver can be revealed and
be routed to receiver. However, this scheme leaks identities
of receivers to a part of untrusted intermediate nodes. R. Lu
et al. put forward a social-based privacy-preserving packet
forwarding protocol in VANETs [8]. The authors deployed
RSUs at high social degree intersections to assist in packet
forwarding between vehicles by temporarily storing packet,
and to carry out re-encryption on the packet in order to
construct mix network. However, locations of receivers are
provided to all relay RSUs and vehicles. Furthermore, in
order to protect the privacy, each packet should be at least
temporarily stored on and re-encrypted by an RSU.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF BUS NETWORK
Understanding the properties of the network composed
of urban buses is essential to the performance of message
delivery. In this section, we study the key features of bus
network based on a real Global Positioning System (GPS)
trace collected from 2,358 buses on 199 bus lines between
Feb. 19th and Mar. 5th, 2007. It covers the downtown area of
Shanghai city of about 120 square kilometers.
We first illustrate the geographical distribution of all bus
lines in Fig. 1, where the red lines represent the aggregated
itineraries of all bus lines. It can be seen that bus lines show a
dense and relatively uniform distribution throughout the whole
region. We refer to the coverage of bus network as the area
that messages can be delivered by a bus of the network, using
short-range wireless communication (e.g., Dedicated Short
Range Communications: DSRC, i.e., 802.11p).
Fig. 2 shows the coverage as the function of wireless com-
munication range. It can be seen that, when communication
range is above 600m, the coverage ratio can reach over 90%
of the total area. Besides, it can also be seen that bus lines
are well inter-connected with different bus lines sharing part
of their routes in common. Both properties indicate that bus
network is ideal for message delivery.
Ideally, buses travel between stops on their routes on time
no matter how the surface traffic changes during the day. In
this case, a simple yet effective way to deliver a message
is to forward the message along the shortest path calculated
based on the fixed bus routes and regular schedules. In reality,
however, the mobility of buses varies dramatically at different
time, especially in metropolises like Shanghai. For example,
Fig. 3 shows the cumulative distribution function of the
traverse time for a bus to travel from one terminal to the other
on its route over all buses during the peak and off-peak hours
in a day, respectively. It can be seen that 80% buses can finish
one-way traversing within 45 minutes during the off-peak
hours but the ratio drops dramatically to about 20% during
the peak hours. The huge variation makes pre-determining the
shortest routing path very hard, if not impossible.
IV. MODELS AND DESIGN GOALS
A. System Model
In BusCast, there are two components: buses and Trust
Authority (TA).
• Buses: are equipped with On-Board Units (OBUs), which
typically consist of a CPU, a large storage, a GPS
module and wireless communication modules. Moving
buses can talk with other buses via short-range wireless
communication (e.g., DSRC) and with the TA via long-
range wireless communication (e.g., GPRS, 3G).
• Trust Authority: is a trustworthy authority, which can
communicate with buses all the time. TA generates com-
mon secret information for buses on the same route.
We assume that buses carry out their functionality properly
but may cause secret information generated by TA leaked
under intrusion of adversaries. We assume each bus has an
Intrusion Detection System (IDS). If an intrusion is detected,
it reports to TA to take corresponding security responses. We
also assume that routes information is available to the public
(e.g., from the website).
B. Attack Model
We characterize adversaries from four perspectives.
First, adversaries can mount both passive and active attacks
which implies not only eavesdropping but also packets injec-
tion and modification on the wireless channel.
Second, adversaries can have the global view of the whole
network traffic by eavesdropping on the open channel.
Third, adversaries behave rationally which means they
launch attacks in order to gain benefits. The goal of adversaries
is to jeopardize use’s privacy. Particularly, we consider privacy
jeopardizing attacks in two aspects:
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• Confidentiality violation: attackers eavesdrop on the
shared medium to catch others communications and
recover the content of packets in order to obtain the
confidential information.
• Anonymity violation: even the content of packets is pro-
tected by encryptions, attackers can also obtain sensitive
information related to identities, locations of victims, by
launching traffic analysis or packet marker attacks. In
traffic analysis attacks, adversaries intercept and examine
encrypted messages in order to deduce information from
patterns in communication. In packet marker attacks, ad-
versaries insert some distinguishable markers into packets
in order to track them.
Last, although intrusions of attackers can be detected by
IDSs, we do not assume that the damage results (secret
exposure) can be avoided perfectly. Adversaries can make
use of the exposed secrets, trying to recover other sensitive
information. Additionally, we assume that the invaded routes
should be a small fraction of all the bus routes.
C. Design Goals
The BusCast design should meet both privacy-related and
routing performance-related requirements.
1) Privacy Requirements
We aim to enable anonymous message delivering. More
specifically, the following properties should be guaranteed.
• Unlinkability between users and destinations should be
guaranteed, which means that it is not possible to trace
who communicates with whom.
• Backward unlinkability between users and destinations
should be guaranteed, which means that even after some
buses are invaded and consequently get secret exposed,
past communications remain untraceable.
• Confidentiality of the messages should be protected.
Sensitive information shared among senders and receivers
will never be disclosed to others.
2) Routing Performance Requirements
Since the number of potential users may be very large, it is
of great importance to consider the scalability of the system.
The BusCast design should minimize the message delivery
delay and the corresponding network cost aroused.
V. OVERVIEW OF BUSCAST DESIGN
To tackle the challenges in realizing message delivery
service, BusCast elegantly integrates three techniques: flex-
ible routing with routing graph, constructing ARS, and re-
generating ARS and re-encrypting user data (to form mix net).
Specifically, BusCast uses a routing graph instead of one
single shortest path to forward a message, in which each edge
indicates how the packet would transfer between bus routes.
By elaborately constructing the routing graph for the message,
plenty of flexibility can be achieved to adapt the uncertainty
of bus mobility caused by dynamic suffice traffic. Given a
routing graph of the message, we construct and associate an
ARS with the message to indicate routing information for
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Fig. 4: An example of the packet forwarding procedure using bus-net.
intermediate relay buses by associating the routing graph with
the message. With the ARS, relay buses can only recover
their own routing instructions about which bus routes are
the next hop presented in the routing paths. To break the
linkability between incoming and outgoing packets, each relay
bus re-generates the ARS without the need to know what
the routing graph is. Furthermore, the confidential messages
of users are also re-encrypted on each relay bus using a
universal re-encryption scheme, which requires no public key
of message receivers. Without linkability during the routing
process, BusCast can defend against traffic analysis attacks.
VI. FLEXIBLE ROUTING WITH ROUTING GRAPH
A. Contact Graph of Buses
Since buses on the same route share the same itinerary, we
consider message delivery problem at the level of bus routes.
Two bus routes are referred to as neighbors if they share partial
itinerary or have intersections.
Suppose that a mobile device user Bob wants to send a
message m to his friend Alice using bus networks, and Bob
knows her location L. Bob forwards m to a nearby passing
bus, then m will be relayed between buses and finally reach to
a bus route passing through L. Fig. 4 illustrates an example of
a message delivery using bus networks. The different colors
of solid lines denote different route paths, and the number in
each circle represents the route ID.
We use a contact graph G = (V,E,W) to represent contacts
between bus routes. A contact graph consists of a set of
vertices V, a set of edges E, and a set of weights W each
of which is assigned to an edge of the graph. Since route
paths are public information, it’s convenient to determine V
and E using neighbor relationship between routes:
• Each vertex vi ∈ V denotes a bus route (line).
• If two bus lines vi, vj ∈ V are neighbors, there are two
edges eˆ(vi, vj), eˆ(vj , vi) ∈ E between vi and vj .(Edges
between two vertices come in pairs, since neighborship
are bidirectional.)
Fig. 5a shows the contact graph G of the bus network in
Fig. 4. According to the static and dynamic features of buses,
wi,j ∈ W can be set in two ways. Assume that the length of
bus line vi is li, there is an edge eˆ(vi, vj) ∈ E, and vi and
vj share x intersections and several road segments. The total
length of share road segments is y. The communication range
between buses is r. According to the above static geographical
feature of vi and vj , wi,j = 1( rli ·x+
y
li
) , where
1
( rli
·x+ yli )
is
an approximation of overlap ratio of vi and vj , and it is
proportional to the contact opportunities between vi and vj .
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(a) Contact graph G (b) An example of routing graph G′
Fig. 5: An example (the bus network in Fig. 4) of Contact Graph and Routing
Graph.
Hence wi,j is proportional to their inter-contact time. A more
realistic (dynamic) way to determine wi,j is using inter-contact
time of routes directly, which denotes the average time elapsed
between two successive contacts of a certain bus on vi and any
one buses on route vj .
B. Extracting Routing Graph
In order to deliver m to Alice effectively, Bob should
indicate (implicit or explicit) location (or identity) information
of Alice to relay buses. Basically, there are two kinds of
routing strategies. First, Bob indicates L explicitly in the
packet. However, it is prohibited for privacy concerns. Second,
Bob plans a routing path using G of the bus network in
advance (called deterministic routing), and uses particular
privacy preserving techniques, such as Onion routing, making
each relay bus only knows a small part of the fix routing
path. However, deterministic routing, such as computing a
shortest path, usually does not work well due to large variation
of contact time and locations between buses, which can
tremendously deviate the values predicted using bus schedules.
Consequently, we introduce flexibility in deterministic rout-
ing. First, senders designate a number of relay instructions
between neighbor bus lines for each packet rather than a fixed
routing path, according to G and performance requirements.
Relay instructions form a Routing Graph G′ = (V′,E′,W′),
which is an induced subgraph of G, i.e., V′ ⊆ V, E′ ⊆
E, W′ ⊆ W. Directed edges eˆ(vi, vj) ∈ E′ denotes a relay
rule. G′ contains at least one source vertex vs : ∀vi ∈
V′, @eˆ(vi, vs) ∈ E′ and one destination vertex vd : ∀vi ∈
V′, @eˆ(vd, vi) ∈ E′. For the example in Fig. 4, a user located
near bus line 4 and 7. The user wants to send a packet to a
place located near bus line 23. Fig. 5b gives an example of
G′. A simple method to extract G′ is to pick k-shortest paths
from vs to vd on G (removing duplicate edges). Sophisticated
methods can be used if more information is available, e.g.,
schedule of buses.
During message delivering, senders deliver a packet to a
passing-by bus of route vs, then the bus carries the packet
until encountering vi that eˆ(vs, vi) ∈ E′, and forwards the
packet to vi. In the same way, the packet is relayed by buses
in a route-by-route manner according to G′ until reaching to
vd. Then the packet is carried by vd and broadcasted in the
vicinity of destination L.
VII. PRIVACY PRESERVING PACKET FORWARDING USING
ANONYMOUS ROUTING STRUCTURE
A. System Initialization
Given a contact graph G, each edge eˆ(vi, vj) ∈ E is mapped
to a routing instruction, referring to a Relay Indicator (RI,
denote as Irly), to indicate one-hop relay from vi to vj . We
also define Broadcast Indicators (BI, denote as Ibst), which
are used to indicate broadcasting areas for the buses.
Each indicator (BI or RI) has two parts: a public Indicator
(Ip) and a secret Indicator (Is). Public indicators are known
to all entities, and are used for constructing ARSs. Secret
indicators are kept by certain routes secretly for verifying
ARSs. It is similar with public/private key pairs, however
indicators serve to build ARS rather than encrypt messages.
TA is responsible for constructing all the indicators in the
system. In addition, TA generates the public parameters and
master-key of the system.
1) Generating Public Indicators
For each route Ri, TA assigns a set of public RIs for Ri
corresponding to edges eˆ(vi, vj) ∈ E in G. In other words,
each RI relates to a neighbor of Ri. For its neighbor Rj ,
the corresponding public RI is Iprly(Ri,Rj) = Ri‖Rj, which
indicates one-hop relay from Ri to Rj. The symbol ‖
represents concatenation between strings.
For example in Fig. 4, R7 has three neighbors which are
R4, R6 and R12. TA assigns three public RIs I
p
rly(R7,R4)
,
Iprly(R7,R6), and I
p
rly(R7,R12)
for R7. It should be noted that
neighbors do not share RIs. R4 and R7 hold I
p
rly(R7,R4)
=
R7‖R4 and Iprly(R4,R7) = R4‖R7, separately.
TA also assigns a set of BIs for Ri representing certain
areas where it should broadcast packets. We divide the urban
area into small cells according to the communication range
of buses. Each cell has an unique identity. Cells within the
coverage area of Ri are organized in sequence of locations
from its departure to terminal station. Assume that n cells
are in the coverage area of Ri, which are {c1, c2, ..., cn}. TA
executes the following operations to construct a binary tree of
public BIs of Ri, so that a BI can be targeted efficiently. The
height of the BI tree is dlog2ne+ 1:
• Root node of the tree is Ipbst(Ri) = Ri, which is used to
indicate whether Ri is one of the last relay routes.
• Split the original set of cells into {c1, c2, ..., cdn/2e} and
{cdn/2e+1, cdn/2e+2, ..., cn}. The first layer public BIs
are Ri‖c1‖...‖cdn/2e and Ri‖cdn/2e+1‖...‖cn, denoted as
Ipbst(Ri 0) and I
p
bst(Ri 1)
.
• Execute the split recursively on two resulting sets, and
get the corresponding public BIs until only one cell left
in each set.
For example in Fig. 4, assume R7 covers 7 cells which
are {c1, c2, ..., c7}. The four layer public BI tree of R7 is
illustrated in Fig. 6. Ri‖cj‖...‖ck indicates that the destination
cell belongs to the set of {cj , ..., ck}.
2) Generating Secret Indicators
For a given public indicator Ip ∈ {0, 1}∗ (either Iprly or
Ipbst), TA computes QI = H1(I
p) ∈ G∗1, and sets the corre-
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Fig. 6: The public BI tree of route R7 which covers 7 cells {c1, c2, ..., c7}.
sponding secret indicator as Is = s(QI + P1). For example,
given Iprly(R7,R6) = R7‖R6, TA generates Isrly(R7,R6) =
s(H1(R7‖R6) + P1); for Ipbst(R7 00) = R7‖c1‖c2, corre-
sponding secret BI Isbst(R7 00) is s(H1(R7‖c1‖c2) + P1). TA
distributes secret indicators to the bus routes they belonging
to, via a secure channel (e.g., secret indicators are signed and
encrypted using a signcryption scheme [18], and transmitted
using 3G network).
3) Generating System Parameters
Given a security parameter n ∈ Z+, TA runs the following
algorithms to generate the public parameters and master-key
in the system.
a. Generate a large prime q, an additive cyclic group G1
and a multiplicative cyclic group G2 of order q, and a
bilinear mapping e : G1 × G1 → G2 [19]. Choose a
random generator P ∈ G1.
b. Pick s R←− Z∗q as master-key, set Ppub = sP .
c. Pick P1
R←− G1.
d. Choose cryptographic hash functions:
H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1,
H2 : G2 → {0, 1}ω, H3 : {0, 1}ω × {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q
e. Set ParA = {q,G1,G2, e, P, P1, Ppub, H,H1, H2, H3}
f. Pick another large prime p that discrete logarithm prob-
lems are difficult on Z∗p, and g ∈ Z∗p which is a primitive
root of Z∗p. Set ParE = {p, g}.
Then TA publishes all public indicators, ParA and ParE
while keeping the master-key s secret.
B. Operations Conducted by Message Senders
Recall the example of Bob and Alice in Section VI. After
extracting the routing graph G′ of m according to G, current
location and L, Bob encrypts m and constructs ARS for m.
1) Encrypting User Data m
Bob uses the universal re-encryption scheme proposed by
P. Golle et al. [7] to encrypt m. The scheme has the feature
that intermediate nodes can re-encrypt m without knowing the
identity or public key of the receiver. Specifically, Bob uses
Alice’s public key pkA = gskA(skA ∈ Zp) to encrypt m, so
that only Alice who holds the secret key skA can recover m.
The ciphertext M has two parts. The second part is used for
the future re-encryptions. The encryption proceeds as follows:
a. Pick a pair of random encryption factors (τ1, τ2) ∈ Z2p.
b. Compute M = {(m · pkτ1A , gτ1); (pkτ2A , gτ2)}.
2) Constructing ARS
Assume the routing graph G′ includes µ routes
{R1, R2, ..., Rµ}, Rµ is the last relay route which covers n
cells {c1, c2, ..., cn}, and L located in cell cρ(1 ≤ ρ ≤ n).
Then Bob imbeds relay and broadcast indicators into ARS,
according to edges of G′ and cρ. Specifically, Bob carries out
the following steps to pick public RIs and BIs.
a. Choose public relay indicators: if e(vRi , vRj ) ∈ G′, 1 ≤
i, j < µ, then pick Iprly(Ri,Rj) = Ri‖Rj .
b. Choose public broadcast indicators:
• Pick Ip
bst(Rµ {0,1}dlog2 ne) = Rµ‖cρ.
• Pick all public BIs on the path from Rµ‖cρ to the root
of BI tree, i.e.,{
Ip
bst(Rµ {0,1}dlog2 ne−1), ..., I
p
bst(Rµ {0,1}), I
p
bst(Rµ)
}
For the example in Fig. 6, if L is in the cell c3, then
Ipbst(R7 010), I
p
bst(R7 01)
, Ipbst(R7 0), and I
p
bst(R7)
(gray circles)
will be selected as public BIs.
Assume Bob has chosen t public indicators Ipi , (1 ≤ i ≤ t)
(both RIs and BIs), he generates the ARS as follows:
a. For each Ipi , compute xi = H(I
p
i ) and Qi = H1(I
p
i ).
b. Compute
`i(x) =
∏
1≤j 6=i≤t
x− xj
xi − xj = ai,1 + ai,2x+ ...+ ai,tx
t−1
where ai,1, ai,2, ..., ai,t ∈ Zq . Then
`i(xj) =
{
1 , if i = j
0 , if i 6= j
c. Set ai = [ai,1, ai,2, ..., ai,t]T . Compute the routing infor-
mation
A1
A2
...
At
 = [a1,a2, ...,at]× [Q1, Q2, ..., Qt]T
=

a1,1Q1 + a2,1Q2 + . . .+ at,1Qt
a1,2Q1 + a2,2Q2 + . . .+ at,2Qt
...
a1,tQ1 + a2,tQ2 + . . .+ at,tQt

d. Pick a string σ R←− {0, 1}ω , and set α = H3(σ,M).
e. Pick an integer β R←− Z∗q , and set y = (β−1α)modq.
f. Compute y · [A1, A2, ..., At] = [B1, B2, ..., Bt] = B.
g. Set ARS = 〈B, αP, βPpub, σ ⊕H2 (e (Ppub, P1)α)〉.
Then Bob sets message C =< ARS,M > and forwards C
to one source route vs in G′ directly.
C. Operations Conducted by Buses
When a bus on Ri receives message C, it verifies whether
Ri was selected as a relay route. If so, the bus re-constructs
C, and relays the updated C according to the indicators.
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TABLE I: ALGORITHM1
Algorithm1: Verify(Ip, Is, ARS,M)
/*ARS = 〈B, αP, βPpub, σ ⊕H2(e(Ppub, P1)α)〉 */
x = H(Ip);
θ = B1 + xB2 + ...+ (x
t−1modq)Bt;
σ¯ = σ ⊕H2 (e (Ppub, P1)α)⊕H2
(
e(αP,Is)
e(βPpub,θ)
)
;
α¯ = H3(σ¯,M);
If α¯P = αP , return TRUE; /* Ip was imbedded in ARS and α¯ = α*/
Else return FALSE.
1) Verifying ARS
The bus on Ri uses its public/secret indicator pairs (Ip, Is)
to verify which indicators were imbedded in the ARS. It
checks the ARS as follows:
a. Verify if the root of Ri’s public BI tree, I
p
bst(Ri)
, was
imbedded in ARS, which means Ri is the last relay route
of C. If so, go to step 2. Otherwise, go to step 3.
b. Verify if its second layer BIs
{
Ipbst(Ri 0), I
p
bst(Ri 1)
}
were imbedded in ARS. One of them is included in
ARS means that C should be broadcasted within the
corresponding region. If one of them was in ARS, Ri
further verifies if any of its two children BIs was imbedded
in ARS, and so on, until reaching to the highest layer
BIs. The highest layer BI imbedded in ARS indicates final
broadcasting cell.
c. Verify relay indicators of Ri to see if some of them were
imbedded in ARS, which means Ri is one of intermediate
relay routes, and C should be sent to one of the routes
included in the corresponding RIs.
Given an indicator pair (Ip, Is), the verification can be done
using Algorithm 1 (Table I).
If all verifications return false, it means that Ri is not in G′.
Hence, Ri simply ignores it. Otherwise, Ri should be either
an intermediate or one of the last relay route.
2) Re-generation of ARS and M
If Ri is an intermediate relay route, the bus on Ri re-
generates the ARS and M in order to build the mix net,
defending against traffic analysis attacks. Then Ri prepares
C =< ARS,M > for next relay. If Ri is the last relay route,
(i.e., Rµ) the bus simply discards the ARS and re-encrypts
M. Then Ri broadcasts M in cell cρ calculated before. The
re-encryption of M proceeds as follows:
a. Choose a random re-encryption factor (τ ′1, τ
′
2) ∈ Z2p.
b. Compute
M′ =
{
(m · pkτ1A (pkτ2A )τ
′
1 , gτ1 (gτ2)
τ ′1); ((pkτ2A )
τ ′2 , (gτ2)
τ ′2)
}
= {(λ0, ρ0) ; (λ1, ρ1)}
The re-generation of the ARS proceeds as follows:
a. Pick a string σ′ R←− {0, 1}ω , and set α′ = H3(σ′,M′).
b. Pick an integer β′ R←− Z∗q .
c. Note RIDi can obtain the value of α from Algorithm
1. Set y′ = ((β′)−1α−1α′)modq.
Fig. 7: An illustration of data forwarding (Bob sends m to Alice) using ARS.
d. Compute
B′ = y′ · B = y′y · [A1, A2, ..., At]
= ((β′β)−1α′)modq · [A1, A2, ..., At]
= [B′1, B
′
2, ..., B
′
t]
e. ARS′ =
〈
B′, α′P, ββ′Ppub, σ′ ⊕H2
(
e (Ppub, P1)
α′
)〉
.
D. Operations conducted by Receivers
When Alice receivesM′, she decryptsM′ using her private
key skA as follows:
a. Verify if λ1/ρskA1 = (pk
τ2
A )
τ ′2 /
(
(gτ2)τ
′
2
)skA
= 1. If
so, decryption is successful, execute step 2. Otherwise,
decryption fails, drop the packet.
b. Compute m = λ0/ρskA0 .
Fig. 7 illustrates the whole procedure data forwarding using
ARS, including the encryption of user data, construction of
ARS, verification of ARS, re-generation of ARS and ciphertext
M, and decryption of user data.
VIII. ANALYSIS
A. Privacy Analysis
We first analyze abilities of different entities on understand-
ing packets, which facilitates privacy analysis of the proposed
scheme. First, for buses in the G′ of a message C(C ′), after
receiving the message, they can verify that some of their
indicators are imbedded in ARS. For the intermediate and
the last relay routes in G′, they can get one-hop routing in-
structions and broadcasting region of the packet, respectively.
Each route in G′ can only reveal indicators of their own, no
one has the knowledge of a whole routing graph. Second,
for buses which are not in G′, after receiving C(C ′), they
verify the ARS in C(C ′) and all the verification fails. Hence
they only know that they are not in G′. Third, because of the
hop-by-hop re-construction of C, neither inside nor outside
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observers can link C to C ′. No one has global view on the 
routing path of C. Although adversaries have global view of 
traffic i n b us n etworks, t hey c an h ardly i nduce t he travelling 
path of single packet. Hence the mix net is constructed from 
both the viewpoint of outside and inside observers. Last, 
m is encrypted by Alices public key, none of them can 
decrypt M(M′) except Alice. Since the confidentiality can 
be achieved obviously, we focus on analyzing the unlinkability 
and backward unlinkability of the proposed method.
1) Unlinkability
Adversaries cannot launch traffic analysis attacks success-
fully by monitoring communication channel for two reasons.
First, buses serving as mix proxies re-construct all communi-
cations in each hop. Content relevance between incoming and
outgoing packets on buses is wiped off. Hence adversaries can-
not link different packets by their contents. Second, buses pick
and forward packets in a store-carry-forward fashion. Buses
receive packets continuously, thus a number of packets are
stored waiting for transmitting. Once a relay opportunity arises
or a bus approaches to broadcasting region, packets under the
same indicator stored on the bus will be relayed all together.
In this way, the spatial and temporal correlations between
incoming and outgoing packets on buses are eliminated.
Adversaries cannot launch packet marker attacks to track
packets. In such attacks, an adversary eavesdrops packet C,
and replaces M with an encrypted marker N that can be
decrypted by it. However, Relay buses can verify that the ARS
is not be generated for M (Since (α¯′ = H3(α¯,N ), however
α¯′P 6= αP ). Then N will be dropped.
2) Backward Unlinkability
If an adversary invades a bus in G′ and gets packet C
recorded by it. By verifying ARS, it can only recover one-hop
routing information. Moreover, any relay bus re-encryptingM
does not know the identity of Alice, which implies that the
adversary cannot get any information of Alice by revisiting
M. Hence backward unlinkability can be achieved.
B. Performance Analysis of Privacy Preserving Mechanisms
The proposed scheme contains operations related to ARS
and m. The performance of the re-encryption scheme on m
has been analyzed in [7]. Hence we focus on the performance
of ARS operations. Table II summarizes the notations used.
Since G and cells are static for a given bus network.
All RIs and BIs over the network are determined. Hence,
senders can conduct one-time computations on xi = H(I
p
i )
and Qi = H1(I
p
i ) for all indicators I
p
i in advance. (xi, Qi)
can be used on all ARS constructions in future. For this
reason, the generation of (xi, Qi) was not counted in the
computation cost. Assume t public indicators are imbedded
in an ARS. Computational and storage complexities of the
ARS are summarized in Table III.
IX. DISCUSSION
A. Increasing the Number of Edges in Routing Graph
In BusCast, increasing the number of edges t in G′ implies
more flexibility. As t grows, the size of ARS is also linearly
TABLE II: NOTATIONS
Notaton Meaning
t The number of public indicators imbedded on ARS
e Bilinear map
φ Bit length of elements in G1
ω Bit length of strings outputted by H2(·)
GA Addition over G1
GM Multiplication over G1
GE Exponentiation over G2
EX Exponentiation over Z∗q
MUL Multiplication over Z∗q
increasing which consumes more communication bandwidth.
In vehicular scenario, where the wireless link quality is very
dynamic, long messages may suffer failures. In BusCast, for
φ = 160 bits (with security comparable to 1024-bit RSA en-
cryption), the length of ARS is 20·(t+2)+ω bytes. Simulation
results show that a relatively small t can significantly boost
packet forwarding. Typical length of t is several tens. Buses re-
generate and verify ARSs without interactions with others. The
operations related to ARS are not restricted by the connecting
time between buses. Hence, we do not analyze the computation
time of ARS in detail.
B. Buses Intrusion Countermeasure
Once TA receives an intrusion warning report from Ri. TA
takes following responses to reset indicators of Ri. First, TA
re-allocates a new ID for the invaded routes, and generates
corresponding secret indicators using master-key s. Second,
resets all indicators of the route Ri using a secure channel.
Third, notifies other buses and users for ID updating.
X. ROUTING PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Methodology
In this section, we examine the performance of BusCast
through trace-driven simulations. We compare BusCast with
two alternative schemes:
• Onion Routing. In this scheme, buses relay a packet
according to the pre-decided shortest path, which is
computed on the contact graph of the bus network.
• Epidemic. In this scheme, buses exchange every packet
whenever they experience a contact. Using this scheme
can achieve the shortest end-to-end delay, however, also
generate a tremendously large volume of network traffic.
We consider three metrics to evaluate the performance of
our algorithm and the above schemes, including end-to-end
delay, delivery ratio and network traffic per packet.
In the following simulations, we use the same trace data
described in Section III. At beginning of each experiment,
we inject 100 packets using a Poisson packet generator. For
each packet, the source and destination are randomly chosen
within the downtown area. The transmission range of buses is
set to 900m. We use two time periods of trace, namely, off-
peak hours (from 2pm to 5pm) and peak hours (from 5pm to
8pm) on Feb. 28th, 2007 to conduct the simulations. For each
simulation configuration, we run the simulation 20 times and
get the average.
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Fig. 8: Delivery ratio of packets and compression
ratio of edges, under different number of paths in
G′.
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Fig. 9: End-to-end delay during off-peak hours
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Fig. 10: End-to-end delay during peak hours.
B. Effect of Routing Graph Size
We first examine the effects of the size of routing graph G′
to the delivery performance. For each packet, G′ is generated
by picking k-shortest paths from the source bus to the desti-
nation on contact graph G. Duplicate edges between paths are
removed. In this set of simulations, G is constructed in a static
way described in Section VI B. Unicast is used to forward
packets. We change k from 1 to 20 at an interval of one. In Fig.
8, the red line indicates that increasing k will result in higher
delivery ratio. The delivery ratio increases very fast when k is
smaller than 6, after that the growth becomes slow. It implies
that a high cost performance ratio can be achieved when k is
6. We also verify the compression ratio of edges in G′. Denote
the number of the edges on path i is pi, and the number of
edges in G is q. The compression ratio of edges is defined as
1− (q/Σk1pi). The blue line shows that the compression ratio
larger that 40% even for very small k, and the compression
ratio increases up to about 60% when k larger than 8. Fig. 8
also plots the end-to-end delay as a function of the number
of k in routing graph. It is clear to see that as the number
of paths increases the delivery delay dramatically drops. The
average traffic per packet is 6 hops.
C. Performance Comparisons under Dynamic Traffic
In this experiment, we compare BusCast with other alter-
native schemes under dynamic traffic conditions, using both
static and dynamic contact graph where the weight wi,j of
edge eˆ(vi, vj) are calculated in different ways.
• In static graph, according to the geographical feature of
vi and vj , wi,j is proportional to the contact opportunities
between vi and vj (see detail in Subsection VI. B).
• In dynamic contact graph, we use average inter-contact
time of routes to determine wi,j . We refer to inter-contact
time as the time elapsed between two successive contacts
of two bus routes. In order to obtain the inter-contact time
of route vi and vj , we first extract all contacts between
buses from vi and vj , respectively, and sort the contacts
in terms of time, then the inter-contact time is computed
at the end of each contact, as the time period between
the end of this contact and the start of the next contact
between the same two routes.
We change k from 2 to 20 at an interval of two and conduct
the experiments. Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 plot the end-to-end delay
during off-peak and peak hours, respectively. It can be seen
that BusCast can achieve very short delay comparing with
Onion routing. Epidemic routing has the shortest delay due
to flooding guarantees that the optimal path can always be
found, however it also generates prohibitive network traffic. As
k increasing, the delay of BusCast is reduced. When k reaches
to 20, BusCast can achieve a very close delay comparing with
epidemic routing. Meanwhile, BusCast only generate moderate
traffic. For example, when k = 6, BusCast generates 9.3 hops
traffic per packet when using dynamic contact graph during
peak hours. It can also be seen that using dynamic contact
graph is always better than using static graph especially when
routing during peak hours.
XI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have developed a message delivery scheme
BusCast which ensures both efficiency and users privacy
in time insensitive scenarios. A flexible routing strategy is
proposed to adapt highly dynamic changes of bus network
topologies. A three-part privacy preserving mechanism is
TABLE III: COMPUTATIONAL AND STORAGE COMPLEXITY OF ARS
Cost of Construction Cost of Re-construction Cost of Verification Cost of SecretIndicator Generation Size of ARS
Number of System
Parameters
(t2 + t+ 2)GM
+(t2 − t)GA
+2MUL
+1EX + 1GE
+1e+ 1H3
+1H2
(t+ 2)GM
+4MUL
+1GE + 1e
+1H3 + 1H2
(t− 1)GM
+(t− 1)GA
+2e+ 1H
+1H3
(t+ 2)ζ
+ω
1GM
+1GA
+1H1
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introduced to ensure anonymous communications. We have
demonstrated the efficacy of BusCast through rigorous analysis
and extensive trace-driven simulations. For our future work,
we intend to investigate different schemes of routing graph
generation, as well as develop shortened ARS to reduce the
cost of bandwidth. Furthermore, we will validate our design
and study its performance under real complex environments.
Improvements will be made based on the realistic studies
before it comes to be deployed in SG.
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